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More than a century of psychology research has shownthat memory is fallible. People’s memory can beinfluenced by information encountered after an inci-
dent has been witnessed—so-called postevent information, or
PEI.1 In everyday life, one of the most common ways to
encounter PEI is when individuals who have shared the same
experience discuss this with one another. In the case of wit-
nessing a crime, individuals might be particularly motivated
to discuss what happened, and who was involved, because of
the significance of the event. The PEI encountered during this
discussion with a co-witness might be largely consistent with
one’s own memories of the event. However, some details may
differ either because one witness has remembered something
differently, has paid attention to different details, or has sim-
ply made an honest mistake in his or her own account. A com-
mon finding within eyewitness-memory literature is that
exposure to PEI that is inconsistent with a person’s own mem-
ory can affect the ability to subsequently report details of the
originally encoded event.2
The following two examples show how the memory report
of one witness may influence that of another witness during a
discussion. Witness evidence in the Oklahoma bombing inci-
dent of 1995 came from employees working at Elliot’s Body
Shop where the perpetrator, Timothy McVeigh, rented the
truck used in the bombing. McVeigh was arrested for the mass
murder but there was a question as to who, if anyone, was his
accomplice when he rented the truck. One of the three
employees working in the shop that day claimed, with some
confidence, that McVeigh was accompanied by a second man.
Initially, the other witnesses gave no description of this alleged
accomplice. However, later they too claimed to remember
details of a second person. This led to a costly police hunt for
a person the FBI now believes does not exist. Several months
later, the witness who had confidently indicated the presence
of an accomplice acknowledged that he may have been recall-
ing another customer. So, why did all three witnesses provide
a description of an accomplice when McVeigh had actually
entered the shop alone? It is likely that the confident witness
unintentionally influenced the others, leading them to report
that they also recalled a second man.3 Indeed, the witnesses
admitted in testimony that they had discussed their memories
before being questioned by investigators.4
The more recent high-profile murder investigation of the
Swedish foreign minister, Anna Lindh, in September 2003,
provides a second example. Witnesses were all placed together
in a small room to prevent them leaving the scene of the crime
before being interviewed. The witnesses later admitted to dis-
cussing the event with one another while in the room.5 During
these discussions, one witness mentioned to the others present
that the perpetrator wore a camouflage-patterned military
jacket. As a result, a number of these witnesses subsequently
reported this clothing detail to the investigating officers. This
description was used in an immediate search for the perpetra-
tor in the surrounding area, and also featured in the release of
a national police alert. This detail, however, was incorrect,
resulting in wasted police time and resources. Footage from
surveillance cameras showed that the killer, Mijailo Mijailovic,
was in fact wearing a grey hooded sweatshirt. Given that wit-
nesses were free to discuss the incident with each other at
some length, it is reasonable to assume that co-witness influ-
ence was the main source of error in the immediate stages of
this investigation.6
These examples highlight that when witnesses discuss their
memories, their accounts of the witnessed event can become
similar, and hence, seemingly corroborative. This phenome-
non is referred to as “memory conformity.”7 When memory
conformity occurs in a formal investigation, whether criminal
or civil, there can be serious and costly implications for any
subsequent investigations. Of course, not all PEI shared
between witnesses will be misleading. There is the potential for
witnesses to share accurate PEI, which can have positive
effects on memory.8 Furthermore, collaborative remembering
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can help people remember details that would otherwise have
been forgotten. However, the notion that group members can
“cross-cue” one another to produce new memories that would
not have been generated if remembering alone is not supported
by research,9 even when attempts are made to increase the
opportunity for cross-cuing.10 In contrast, a large amount of
research has shown that people are easily influenced by mis-
leading PEI encountered from another person.11
Criminal events are often witnessed by more than one per-
son,12 and discussion between witnesses is common.13 For
example, an Australian survey of students who had witnessed
a crime found that where multiple witnesses had been present,
86% of respondents admitted to discussing the event with a co-
witness.14 More recently, a U.K. survey of eyewitnesses who
were interviewed after viewing a lineup revealed that the
majority had witnessed the crime with other people present,
and more than half of these people had discussed the event
with a co-witness.15 Although it is best practice for the police
to encourage witnesses to the same event not to discuss their
memories for fear of evidence contamination, it is likely that
many witnesses do enter into discussions about the event both
before the police arrive and afterward, even if police warned
them not to do so. In such circumstances investigators and
jurors may subsequently attach a false corroborative value to
any consistencies between witness statements obtained or any
evidence given in court thereafter, when the evidence may be
contaminated if the witnesses had discussed their memories
before being interviewed by the police.
EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH ON MEMORY CONFORMITY
There are different approaches to studying memory.16 As
cognitive psychologists our approach is to understand the
processes that can lead to an individual reporting an event in a
certain way, such as reporting what another person has said
when asked to give an independent report. We try to isolate a
small number of factors and then vary those factors systemati-
cally to see how they affect response. This study is well suited
for the legal arena because the interest in this context is the
reliability of individual eyewitnesses and the factors that can
affect that reliability. 
The basic memory-conformity procedure is to show a small
group of people (often just a
pair) some set of stimuli or an
event, have the people interact
with each other, and then indi-
vidually test each person about
what he or she remembers. One
critical decision memory-con-
formity researchers have to
make is whether to have the
PEI delivered from one partici-
pant to another, or to have a
confederate (a person working
for the researcher but pretend-
ing to be a participant) deliver
the PEI. When participants are
presenting PEI to each other, it is common to show them
slightly different materials so that disagreements are likely.
Consider one study that used this approach:17 Two versions of
a crime event were made, each containing the same sequence of
events but filmed from different angles to simulate different wit-
ness vantage points. The different viewing angles allowed the
participants to see two different critical features of the event.
After viewing, participants had an opportunity to remember the
event together, where the critical features were often discussed.
An individual memory test followed and 71% of witnesses who
had discussed the event reported at least one of the two erro-
neous critical details acquired from their co-witness. 
Using a confederate has some advantages over other meth-
ods because well-trained confederates can impart the same
PEI, in the same manner, to all participants during the course
of a discussion. For example, Gabbert et al. used a confederate
to examine whether participants are more suggestible when
post-event misinformation is encountered socially via a face-
to-face discussion rather than when it is encountered via non-
social means.18 Participants viewed a simulated crime event
and were later exposed to four items of misleading PEI about
the event. This came within the context of a discussion with a
confederate whom they believed to be a fellow participant, or
within a written narrative allegedly written by a previous par-
ticipant. The confederate was trained to disclose the same
items of correct and misleading PEI that were present in the
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misleading narrative. In a final
memory test about the crime
event, participants who had
encountered the misleading
PEI socially were more likely to
report this misinformation
than those who had encoun-
tered the same misinformation
while reading the narrative. 
Irrespective of the methods
utilized, the focus of memory-
conformity research is on
understanding why people
report information that has
merely been  suggested to
them, thus allowing for  possible predictions to be made as to
when these effects are most likely to occur. Furthermore, this
area of research also provides a grounding for predicting
whether certain people are particularly likely to conform to
another witness’s memory rather than relying on their own. 
Figure 1 shows a model of memory conformity with two
routes for reporting what another person has said rather than
reporting what one remembers.19 The top, normative route
involves the person comparing the cost of disagreeing with the
cost of making an error. People may agree with another person
because of normative pressures to conform even when they
believe the response is in error. Normative motivations to con-
form often reflect an individual’s need for social approval and
manifest as public declarations of agreement despite private dis-
agreement. Thus, people might outwardly agree with another
person’s recollected version of events when privately they do
not believe that is what actually happened.20 Normative influ-
ence can be shown by people reporting the same thing as some-
body else when the other person is present, but reverting to
their own belief when questioned privately.21 Normative influ-
ences are strongest when the costs of disagreeing are high.
Under these conditions, participants engaging in collaborative
retrieval may appear to be in agreement with each other when
in fact this behavior reveals little about social influences on
memory and more about motivations and behaviors to increase
social acceptance and to appear more likeable.22 For example,
Baron, Vandello, and Brunsman conducted an eyewitness-iden-
tification study and found that participants knowingly gave an
incorrect response so as not to disagree with a confederate
when they were told the results were of little importance (that
their responses would be used as pilot data) but were less likely
to conform when they were told the results were important
(that their responses would be used by the police and courts).23
The bottom, or informational, route in Figure 1 involves the
witness comparing how accurate they think they are with how
accurate they think the co-witness is. The person must decide
which source of information is more trustworthy.
Informational motivations to conform are reflected in a per-
son’s decision to accept and later report PEI encountered from
a co-witness if it is believed to be correct. This is particularly
likely in situations where an individual doubts the accuracy of
his or her own memory or when the information encountered
from another individual convinces them that his or her initial
judgment might be wrong, thus supporting Festinger’s24 asser-
tion that the need to feel certainty or confidence in one’s beliefs
drives much social influence.25
Several research laboratories have investigated how norma-
tive and informational influences affect the ways in which peo-
ple respond to memory probes. Most of the research is done by
altering one of the factors shown in the ellipses on the left of
Figure 1 (e.g., the cost of making an error). Altering each of
these produces systematic effects on how people respond.
Below we review some of these studies.
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Conformity in Adolescents, 24 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1034
(2010).
20. See Robert B. Cialdini & Noah J. Goldstein, Social Influence:
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299 (2008); Schneider & Watkins, supra note 11; John S. Shaw et
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915 (1996).
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25. See Curtis D. Hardin & E. Tory Higgins, Shared Reality: How Social
Verification Makes the Subjective Objective, in HANDBOOK OF
MOTIVATION AND COGNITION: THE INTERPERSONAL CONTEXT 28 (E.
Tory Higgins & Richard M Sorrentino eds.,vol. 3, 1996).
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FIGURE 1. A MODEL OF MEMORY CONFORMITY. 
ADAPTED FROM DANIEL B. WRIGHT ET AL., SOCIAL ANXIETY
MODERATES MEMORY CONFORMITY IN ADOLESCENTS, 24 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1034 (2010).
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Acquaintance versus Stranger Studies
When a crime occurs there are often multiple witnesses.
Sometimes these witnesses are acquaintances, and sometimes
they are strangers. An important applied question is whether
the relationship between co-witnesses affects how susceptible
they are to each other’s influence. We expect that there is a
larger cost of disagreeing when one knows the other person. It
may also be that people think their acquaintances have better
memories than strangers. Thus, from Figure 1 we predict that
acquaintances should be more susceptible to memory-confor-
mity effects than strangers, and two studies offer support in
respect of these predictions. Hope, Ost, Gabbert, Healey, and
Lenton found that previously acquainted witnesses, in this
case pairs of friends and romantic partners, were more likely to
report information obtained from their co-witness than were
previously unacquainted strangers.26 French, Garry, and Mori
also found previously acquainted participants (romantic part-
ners) showed an increased susceptibility to memory confor-
mity than strangers.27
Thus, the more prepared we are to accept another person’s
judgments and value his or her opinion, the more we become
subject to his or her influence.28 From an applied perspective
the difference between acquaintances and strangers is likely to
be even larger because acquaintances are more likely to engage
in conversations in the days after viewing a crime. Thus, it is
important for the police to get independent testimony from
acquaintances as soon as possible after the event. In court it is
important that the types of relationships held among different
witnesses are considered. 
Beliefs in Own and Other Person’s Memory
Figure 1 shows that a person’s final belief about a memory
can be reached by comparing the belief he or she has in his or
her own memory with the belief he or she has in another per-
son’s memory. How this combination occurs is complex, but the
basic findings are that stronger beliefs in one’s own memory
inoculate a person from memory-conformity effects, and
stronger beliefs in another person’s memory can increase the
influence of that person’s memory report. Supporting this,
research has found that the overt confidence with which indi-
viduals make their assertions to each other can operate system-
atically as a cue that promotes conformity.29 This explains why
the confident memory of an accomplice in the Oklahoma
bombing case quickly spread to the reports given by the co-
workers. For example, Wright et al. investigated memory con-
formity between co-witnesses by showing pairs of participants
a storybook containing 21 color pictures depicting a crime tak-
ing place.30 The storybooks were identical, except in one the
culprit had an accomplice and
in one there was no accomplice.
Participants were then asked
true/false recognition questions
about what they had seen and
rated their confidence after each
question. Following this they
discussed their memories about
the sequence of events, includ-
ing whether there was an
accomplice, and then answered
the same questions. While the people within each pair initially
disagreed about there being an accomplice, after discussing the
event most of the pairs were in agreement. The person in the
pair who was initially more confident tended to persuade the
other person in the pair. More recently Allan and Gabbert sys-
tematically manipulated the confidence with which accurate
and misleading PEI was delivered to participants.31 They found
further support that a person’s confidence in what he or she has
to say can alter the immediate persuasiveness of its content, and
that people make use of their perceptions of confidence as a cue
when determining who is most likely to be correct.32
Tendencies to conform can also be affected by manipulating
the perceptions of each individual regarding the relative
knowledge each has of stimuli they encoded together. Gabbert,
Memon, and Wright showed pairs of people a series of com-
plex drawings, which they believed were exactly the same, but
in fact had some slight differences.33 The pair was told that one
of them had viewed slides for twice the length of time as the
other, though actual encoding duration was the same.
Participants who believed they had seen the slides for less time
than their partner were more likely to conform to their part-
ner’s memory for items than those who thought they had
viewed the slides longer. Thus, individuals who believe they
have an inferior memory quality to others are more likely to
become influenced by, and subsequently report, items of errant
PEI encountered from another person. 
An important application of this is that the roles witnesses
have will often differ, and sometimes these roles will determine
how influential a witness is when remembering an event
together with co-witnesses. For example, there are differences
between a bystander or observer and a witness who interacts
with a criminal. Carlucci, Kieckhaefer, Schwartz, Villalba, and
Wright showed bystanders can be more susceptible to mem-
ory-conformity effects than people who interact with a target
person.34 They had a male confederate approach a group of
people on a crowded beach in South Florida and ask one of the
people for the time. The confederate walked out of view, and a
26. Lorraine Hope et al., “With a Little Help from My Friends…”: The
Role of Co-Witness Relationship in Susceptibility to Misinformation,
127 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 476 (2008).
27. Lauren French et al., The MORI Techniques Produces Memory
Conformity in Western Subjects, 22 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
431 (2007).
28. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
29. Allan & Gabbert, supra note 21; Schneider & Watkins; supra note
11; Wright et al., supra note 7.
30. Wright et al., supra note 7.
31. Allan & Gabbert, supra note 21. 
32. See Schneider & Watkins, supra note 11.
33. Fiona Gabbert et al., I Saw It for Longer Than You: The Relationship
Between Encoding Duration and Memory Conformity, 124 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 319 (2007).
34. Marianna Carlucci et al., The South Beach Study: Bystanders’
Memories are More Malleable, 25 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 562
(2011).
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(1993). 
42. Id.
43. Linda A. Henkel & Nancy Franklin, Reality Monitoring of
Physically Similar and Conceptually Related Objects, 26 MEMORY &
COGNITION 659 (1998); Roslyn Markham & Lisa Hynes, The Effect
of Vividness of Imagery on Reality Monitoring, 17 J. MENTAL IMAGERY
159 (1993).
research assistant approached
either the person who inter-
acted with the confederate or
another person in the group.
The research assistant showed
the person a six-person target-
absent lineup. After that person
had made an identification, the
research assistant turned to
another person and asked that
she or he also make an identification. When responding sec-
ond, the bystander was more than twice as likely to conform
than the person who had previously interacted with the con-
federate. From a theoretical perspective, this suggests that peo-
ple believe bystanders have worse memories than those
directly involved with an interaction. From an applied per-
spective, it is important for investigators to consider the role of
all the witnesses and to take this into account when it is sus-
pected that the witnesses may have discussed the crime. 
Source Credibility
Further support for informational influence underlying
some of the observed memory-conformity effects comes from
research showing that the size of the memory-conformity effect
is moderated by person-perception factors, such as perceived
source credibility. For example, Kwong See, Hoffman, and
Wood showed participants (young adults) a slide show depict-
ing a theft and then presented them with a narrative summa-
rizing the incident.35 To manipulate source credibility, this nar-
rative was either introduced as being an account of the event
as remembered by a 28-year-old or an 82-year-old. In fact, the
narratives were the same, each including four items of mis-
leading PEI. Because the young adult participants trusted
young people’s memories more than the memories of older
adults, from Figure 1 we would predict that participants would
be more influenced by the young-adult reports. This is what
the researchers found. Participants were more likely to coa-
lesce with the younger adult’s memories than with those of the
older adult. Skagerberg and Wright found similar results.36
Participants were more influenced if the co-witness was a fel-
low student or a police officer than if the co-witness was a
child. These results have applied significance. Some groups of
people will be more influential than others. If a police officer
at the scene of a crime confidently states that “a red car passed
through the stop sign,” this will have a larger impact on co-wit-
nesses than if a young child gave the same statement. 
In summary, memory-conformity effects are often driven by
informational influences. People conform to another person’s
version of events when that person is perceived as more
knowledgeable, more confident, and/or more credible. Because
of this, conformity effects driven by informational influence
may persist over a delay,37 and people may report the suggested
information in private as well as public.38 Even in situations
where it is vital to provide an accurate and unbiased opinion,
research suggests that individuals who are uncertain are likely
to conform to another person’s decision or memories.39
Source Misattributions
Another explanation for the memory-conformity effect is
that people have made a source misattribution where a mem-
ory from one source (e.g., a discussion with a co-witness) is
mistakenly misattributed to another source (e.g., the witnessed
event), and thus reported as if it is a personal memory. In other
words, it is possible for people to construct a (false) memory
based on what the other person has said. This is not illustrated
in Figure 1 because we believe the processes and time-course
are different to that of normative or informational routes to
memory conformity. However, believing something is correct
(the informational route) can facilitate the creation of a false
memory.40
The source-monitoring framework describes the judgment
processes that individuals employ to accurately identify the
source of a memory, as well as specifying factors that are likely
to promote source-monitoring errors.41 For example, accord-
ing to the source-monitoring framework, our memories con-
tain various characteristics that provide clues as to their origin.
Memories from different sources tend to differ on average in
the quantity and quality of the characteristics associated with
them. Individuals use these differences in memory characteris-
tics as heuristics to attribute their memories to a particular
source. However, there is no single aspect of our memories that
specifies the true source without fail, and, as a consequence,
source misattributions can occur.42
Research and theory on the accuracy of source monitoring
has shown that source-confusion errors increase when there is
an overlap in the memory characteristics from two different
sources.43 This finding is particularly relevant, as there is a
large amount of contextual overlap between the encoding
phase and the misinformation phase within memory-confor-
mity experiments. Both phases of the experiment concern the
“[B]elieving 
something is 
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creation of a 
false memory.”
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witnessed stimuli and thus overlap in terms of content.
Furthermore, both phases (usually) take place within a limited
time frame and in the same experimental environment. In real
life, a similar amount of contextual overlap might be expected.
Co-witnesses are likely to talk about what they have just seen
(content overlap); they are likely to do this immediately after
the crime event (temporal overlap); and it is likely that this
discussion occurs at the scene, while waiting for the police to
arrive, rather than at a different location (environmental over-
lap). The consequences of source-monitoring errors can be
very serious in a criminal investigation, as they have the poten-
tial to lead to inaccurate testimony, biased evidence, and false
corroboration between witnesses. 
Gabbert et al. examined the extent to which source confu-
sions are accountable for the memory-conformity effect.44 Over
the course of the experiment, participants engaged in a series of
discussions with a co-witness about details featured in slides.
Each member of the pair had in fact viewed slightly different
versions of the slides—a manipulation that introduced the
potential for them to share items of misleading PEI. Following
each discussion, they were asked to provide an individual
account of what had been seen. At the end of the experiment a
source-monitoring task was administered where participants
were asked to review their free-recall responses and to (a) circle
the details that they remembered hearing from their co-witness
but not actually seeing themselves; (b) leave unmarked the
details that they did remember seeing in the pictures; and (c)
underline the details for which they could not remember the
source. About half of the errantly reported details were correctly
categorized as having been encountered in the co-witness dis-
cussions; however, about half were incorrectly attributed to
having been seen in the original slide presentation. 
Similar findings were reported in a study by Paterson et al.45
Participants discussed their recollections of a mock crime
event with a co-witness who had seen a slightly different ver-
sion. One week later they were interviewed separately about
what they could remember. Following the interview, partici-
pants were asked to read through their statements and indicate
the source of each item of information reported by attributing
it to one of four sources: video only, discussion only, both the
video and discussion, or unsure. If participants reported sug-
gested items at test and correctly attributed these to having
originated from the co-witness discussion, then the source-
monitoring decision was coded as being accurate. However, if
suggested items of information that had been reported at test
were attributed to (a) the video or (b) the video and discus-
sion, then the source-monitoring decision was coded as being
inaccurate. Participants frequently reported that they had seen
items of PEI that had in fact only been suggested to them in the
co-witness discussion. Accurate source-monitoring judgments
were made on only 43% of occasions. 
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO 
PROTECT AGAINST MEMORY
CONFORMITY?
Paterson et al. examined
whether a warning to disregard
PEI encountered from a co-witness
was effective in reducing memory
conformity.46 Participants viewed a
mock crime event that was either
the same or slightly different to the
event viewed by their partner.
Following this, they discussed
their memories together. One week later, half of the partici-
pants from each condition were given a warning that they may
have been exposed to misleading PEI from the co-witness with
whom they had discussed the event. Participants were then
individually interviewed about what they had seen in the
event. Paterson et al. found that 28% of participants who
received a warning reported at least one piece of misinforma-
tion in comparison to 32% of those who did not receive a
warning.47 Thus, warning participants about misinformation
one week after exposure did not appear to substantially reduce
the memory-conformity effect. 
It is known that people forget the source of the information
faster than the information itself, so perhaps the warning in
Paterson et al.’s study was given too late for the participants to
effectively monitor the source of information relating to a
crime event and to disregard items of PEI encountered from
the co-witness. To investigate this, the researchers ran a second
study to explore whether warning participants about potential
exposure to misinformation immediately after the co-witness
discussion was more effective than giving the warning after a
week. A control group received no warning. Once again,
researchers found that warning participants that they may have
been exposed to misleading PEI from their co-witness did not
significantly reduce their susceptibility to memory conformity. 
Bodner, Musch, and Azad had more success with warning
participants to disregard PEI from a co-witness.48 Their warn-
ing explicitly asked participants not to report details that they
acquired from their secondary source unless they also remem-
bered seeing the details. The warning was given to participants
in the same test session as viewing and discussing an event. In
contrast to Paterson et al.’s findings,49 Bodner et al. found that
the warning was effective and sharply reduced the rate of
reporting non-witnessed details. However, even with such
minimal delay between the co-witness discussion and the
instruction to disregard non-remembered items of PEI, the
warnings did not eliminate the memory-conformity effect.
Meade and Roediger have also found that warnings can reduce,
but not eliminate, the memory-conformity effect.50
In sum, research shows that post-warnings to disregard PEI
are not always successful because people often do not remem-
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ber where they heard informa-
tion. This is particularly true
long after the discussion with
co-witnesses. Police investiga-
tors and others in the criminal
justice system should ask wit-
nesses if they spoke with co-
witnesses about the crime.51
The problem with this is that
people may have forgotten if
they had engaged in discus-
sions with others, and it is
very likely they will have poor
memories for what was dis-
cussed. Warnings to disregard PEI will only work if individu-
als are able to remember the source of the information that
they are able to recall. Thus, the differences found between
studies that have and have not found warnings to be effective
probably reflect differences in the strength of people’s memo-
ries caused by encoding quality, the delay between study and
test, motivations to remember, etc. Where memory conformity
has occurred as a result of a genuine memory distortion,
namely, a source confusion, witnesses may be unable to accu-
rately retrieve the source of the information and may claim to
remember seeing items of information that have actually been
encountered from a co-witness.52 That some research has
found source judgments can be wrong, even with deliberate
consideration, highlights the fact that being able to recall
memories does not guarantee their authenticity.
Perhaps trying to prevent potentially contaminating interac-
tions and recording memories before any interactions is a bet-
ter approach than using post-event warnings. Police should
separate witnesses as much as possible and encourage them
not to discuss the crime. An alternative approach is to gather
memories from as many witnesses as possible before contami-
nation can occur (and also before memories have had much
time to weaken).
A novel way to obtain information from witnesses quickly,
and strengthen memory in the process, is to ask witnesses to
complete the “Self-Administered Interview” as soon after a wit-
nessed incident as possible.53 The Self-Administered Interview,
or SAI, is a recall tool, currently in booklet form, designed to
obtain high-quality information from witnesses quickly and
efficiently at the scene of an incident or shortly afterwards. It
contains information about what is expected of the witness,
instructions to facilitate the use of retrieval techniques, and
questions prompting the witness to disclose what happened
during the event and who was involved. The SAI is a generic
response tool in that it is suitable for obtaining evidence about
a wide range of different incidents. It is currently in opera-
tional use by some police forces in the U.K. 
During development and early testing of the SAI, mock wit-
nesses, comprising a sample of community volunteers, viewed
a simulated event and were required to report as much as they
could about what they had seen.54 Witnesses who completed
the SAI tool reported 42% more correct details than partici-
pants who were simply asked to report what they had seen. In
a second study, mock witnesses who completed the SAI
recalled approximately 30% more correct details after one
week than did witnesses who did not have an early recall
opportunity. These results suggest that the SAI facilitates the
retrieval and reporting of accurate information, as well as
strengthening and protecting memory for a witnessed incident
such that forgetting is minimized. 
Recent research by Gabbert and colleagues examined the
hypothesis that because the SAI seemingly works by strength-
ening the original episodic memory (the “Belief in own mem-
ory” from Figure 1), mock witnesses who complete an SAI
shortly after viewing a simulated crime event will be better
able to detect and resist items of misleading PEI encountered
subsequently.55 Findings were in line with predicted results.56
Research by Geiselman, Fisher, Cohen, Holland, and Surtes, as
well as Memon, Zaragoza, Clifford, and Kidd have also shown
that participants are better able to be vigilant against discrep-
ancies if their memory for a target event is strengthened.57
SUMMARY 
It is crucial to gain firsthand reports from witnesses during
any investigation. However, the research presented here has
shown that memories are malleable and that individuals are
vulnerable to conforming to other people’s memory reports.
People frequently report items at test that they have encoun-
tered during a discussion with a co-witness rather than per-
ceived themselves. Real-life cases highlight the serious conse-
quences of memory conformity occurring in the context of a
forensic investigation. Research therefore continues to use and
to refine methods that allow a controlled examination of the
effects of naturalistic interactions on subsequent memory
reports. Factors that increase, decrease, and possibly eliminate
the longer-term effects of memory conformity are investigated.
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This body of research has revealed that memory conformity
occurs most often when individuals are not confident enough
in their own memory to notice and to reject discrepant PEI,
and when individuals believe that someone else’s memory for
a witnessed event is more reliable than their own. Police
should always ask witnesses if they have discussed the incident
with another witness and warn against reporting any informa-
tion that they do not remember themselves. Warnings to dis-
regard PEI from a co-witness are not always effective; however,
interviewing witnesses with minimal delay, using a tool such as
the SAI if necessary, may facilitate their ability to differentiate
between their own memories and someone else’s.
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